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15 
BLURRING THE LINES: THE CONTINUITIES BETWEEN 
EXECUTIVE POWER AND PREROGATIVE 
CLEMENT FATOVIC∗ 
The idea that the President of the United States possesses preroga-
tive, or what John Locke defined as the “[p]ower to act according to 
discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the Law, 
and sometimes even against it,”1 is deeply unsettling.  According to 
Locke’s formulation, prerogative is supposed to be used only in ex-
traordinary circumstances and only until the Legislature can remedy 
whatever defect in the law requires resort to extra-legal measures, but 
the notion that any individual is ever allowed to exercise such enor-
mous discretionary power is difficult to square with a commitment to 
limited government and the rule of law.  Prerogative entails the use of 
ad hoc and variable measures that are inconsistent with the predicta-
bility and uniformity that the rule of law has always required.2  The 
United States Constitution does contain several provisions that could 
be interpreted as emergency powers, including the power to suspend 
the writ of habeas corpus3 and the presidential power to convene both 
houses of Congress “on extraordinary Occasions,”4 but it makes no 
mention of any power to act extra-legally.5  Thus, it is no surprise that 
legal and political scholars characterize prerogative (when they 
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tutional Law Schmooze: Executive Power, and in particular Mark Graber, for thought-
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 1.  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 393 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1970) (1690). 
 2.  For surveys of ideas associated with the rule of law, see RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE 
OF LAW IN AMERICA (2001); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitu-
tional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
 3.  U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 4.  U.S. CONST. art II, § 3. 
 5.  Thus, according to this view, the pardoning power and the veto power are “the 
only discretionary powers that the President actually possesses.”  Morton J. Frisch, Executive 
Power and Republican Government—1787, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 281, 286 (1987).  
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acknowledge it at all) as an aberration from the normal operation of 
executive power.6  Whereas prerogative is a highly discretionary power 
that operates outside the bounds of the law, executive power is a rule-
bound power that operates within the bounds of the law. 
I argue that the rigid opposition that has dominated scholarship 
on this topic tends to overstate the differences between executive 
power and prerogative.  Instead of viewing these forms of power as be-
longing to separate and distinct categories, it might be more accurate 
to view them as lying along a continuum that stretches from the least 
rule-bound to the most rule-bound exercises of power.  This has im-
portant implications for how we understand both prerogative and ex-
ecutive power.  Contrary to those who would suggest that prerogative 
is a wholly lawless power, this means that legal rules structure and 
regulate exercises of even the most extraordinary forms of preroga-
tive.  Prerogative, as Locke defined it, is supposed to be a narrowly tai-
lored response to very specific deficiencies in the law, not an unfet-
tered power that gives executives carte blanche to do as they please.  
At the very least, law provides a normative framework within which 
prerogative operates.  That is, an exercise of prerogative that violates 
one law or set of laws does not necessarily challenge the entire system 
of law or rule of law values.7  Contrary to those who would argue that 
executive power is or ought to be wholly defined and structured by 
law, this means that there is an unavoidable element of discretion ir-
reducible to law in even the most ordinary exercises of executive pow-
er.8  That is, even routine exercises of executive power either exceed 
the law or have the potential to do so, if only in small ways.  In short, 
some forms and exercises of executive power are far more rule-bound 
and others are far less so.9  This may help explain why executive pow-
                                                        
 6.  See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 7–10 (First Mari-
ner Books 2004) (1973) (“The idea of prerogative was not part of presidential power as de-
fined in the Constitution.”). 
 7.  Deviation from particular legal rules is not to be confused with the suspension of 
the legal order “in its entirety” that Carl Schmitt infamously defended in Political Theology: 
Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty.  See generally CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: 
FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chica-
go Press 2005) (1992).  For a defense of the idea that extra-legal measures can actually 
uphold rule of law values, see Oren Gross, Extra-Legality and the Ethic of Political Responsibil-
ity, in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 60 (Victor V. Ramraj ed., 2008). 
 8.  It is also worth bearing in mind that law itself confers and invites discretion.  Even 
in its most rule-like forms, law never completely determines action.  
 9.  To acknowledge this feature of executive power is not necessarily to endorse it.  
Nor is an acknowledgement that there is an element of prerogative in all executive power 
an argument against the rule of law.  In fact, recognizing the extent to which every exer-
cise of executive power contains an element of discretion irreducible to law is the first step 
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er is such an indistinct concept in so much legal and political 
thought.10 
None of this is to suggest that there are no meaningful differ-
ences between exercises of power that have been prescribed by law 
and those that have not.  In the strictest sense, exercises of preroga-
tive in American history have been rare, limited mainly to extraordi-
nary wartime measures such as President Abraham Lincoln’s orders to 
increase the size of the Army and Navy and payments to private citi-
zens to facilitate recruitment efforts.11  Indeed, there are very good 
normative reasons to distinguish between exercises of power that are 
consistent with the law from those that are not, but I suggest that it is 
also important for analytical reasons to recognize that the distinction 
between prerogative and executive power is not necessarily as clear-
cut as many have suggested.  Discretionary exercises of power that 
walk up to, and sometimes even step over, the limits of the law are not 
restricted to moments of emergency but occur on a far more regular 
basis, albeit in far less dramatic ways than prerogative in the strictest 
sense.  The insistence on a rigid separation between these two forms 
of power, however, makes it easy to overlook the continuities between 
prerogative and executive power. 
                                                        
toward constraining abuses of that discretion.  In recent years, it has not been the critics of 
expanded executive power but its staunchest defenders who have insisted that prerogative 
is an improper framework for analyzing the way that presidential power has been exercised 
since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  The most outspoken proponents of 
broad executive powers in the Bush Administration’s so-called War on Terror, including 
Vice President Dick Cheney and Deputy Assistant Attorney General John Yoo, consistently 
maintained that the extraordinary powers wielded by the President were fully authorized 
by existing laws.  See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION 
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 1–11 (2005); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN 
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR (2006) (noting that Congress had authorized 
the President to use force in response to the September 11 attacks and that Congress had 
recognized military commissions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice).  For critiques of 
this position, see HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
(2009) (criticizing the inflated view of executive power during the Bush Administration); 
JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2009) (discussing the negative effects of the Bush Administration’s fo-
cus on hard power preogative in the War on Terror).  
 10.  Edward S. Corwin opened his classic study of the presidency with the observation 
that, unlike “legislative power” and “judicial power,” “‘executive power’ is still indefinite as 
to function and retains, particularly when it is exercised by a single individual, much of its 
original plasticity as to method.” EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 
1787–1957, at  3 (4th rev. ed. 1957).  
 11.  On the extraordinary and even extra-legal character of President Lincoln’s actions 
during the Civil War, see DANIEL FARBER, LINCOLN’S CONSTITUTION 115–75 (2003); 
CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN 
DEMOCRACIES 223–39 (6th prtg. 2009) (1948);  Benjamin A. Kleinerman, Lincoln’s Example: 
Executive Power and the Survival of Constitutionalism, 3 PERSP. ON POL. 801, 805–08 (2005). 
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The sharpness of this distinction reflects the sharpness of the dis-
tinction between normalcy and emergency that informs so much po-
litical and scholarly discourse.  Although there is no agreement either 
in theory or in practice about the proper way to define a state of 
emergency,12 there is wide agreement that an emergency situation is 
categorically distinct from a normal situation.  Even among scholars 
who are careful to distinguish among different types of emergencies, 
it is generally assumed that a situation can definitely be classified as an 
emergency or non-emergency.13  A time of emergency is often likened 
to a time of war, which is treated as a discrete time period that can be 
easily distinguished from peacetime.14  It should come as no surprise 
that the opposition between emergency and normalcy leads to a pro-
liferation of other binaries that reinforce the divisions between these 
circumstances: normal/abnormal, ordinary/extraordinary, rou-
tine/special, regular/extreme, calm/urgent.15  Perhaps the starkest 
version of this opposition appears in the work of the German legal 
and political theorist-turned-Nazi, Carl Schmitt, who characterized 
the differences between these two states in terms of an unbridgeable 
ontological divide between the “norm” and the “exception.”  Accord-
ing to Schmitt, the norm pertains to a predictable and orderly “every-
day frame of life” amenable to legal regulation,16 whereas the excep-
tion refers to “a case of extreme peril” that cannot be “codified in the 
existing legal order.”17 
The use of such binary oppositions is often unavoidable, but as 
political theorist Nomi Lazar has argued, they tend to obscure the 
                                                        
 12.  OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY 
POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5–6 (2006). 
 13.  See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 42–44 (2006) (attempting to identify a framework by 
which to define “state of emergency”); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1–2 (Kev-
in Attell trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2005) (noting that the “state of exception” exists, 
although it is difficult to define); DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW: 
LEGALITY IN A TIME OF EMERGENCY 17 (2006) (noting that states of emergency place legal 
and executive order under great stress); John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of 
the Exception: A Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210, 210 (2004) (noting 
that emergency situations occur when there is an urgent threat to the state or regime). 
 14.  For a critique of this tendency, see generally, MARY DUDZIAK, WAR TIME: AN IDEA, 
ITS HISTORY, ITS CONSEQUENCES (2012) (discussing the likening of emergency to war-
time). 
 15.  On the tendency of binaries to multiply, see ANNE NORTON, 95 THESES ON 
POLITICS, CULTURE, AND METHOD 39–40 (2004). 
 16.  SCHMITT, supra note 7, at 13. 
 17.  Id. at 6. 
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continuities between normal and emergency circumstances.18  Lazar 
contends that the effect of these oppositions is to treat emergencies as 
if the responses to them require the adoption of logics and values that 
are alien to those that operate in “normal” circumstances.19  She ar-
gues that “the norm/exception dichotomy is empirically and ethically 
suspect” because it ignores the extent to which normal institutions 
and values continue to function in times of emergency and because it 
often serves as a pretext for the unjustified abandonment of liberal 
democratic values.20  Instead of viewing the differences between 
emergency and normalcy as differences in kind, she suggests that they 
vary in degree (specifically, in terms of the urgency and the scale of 
the crisis that confronts a government).21  As a result, emergencies are 
notoriously difficult to define with any precision.22 
Although Lazar’s argument is concerned with the elements of 
normalcy that are always present in emergency, my argument focuses 
on the element of prerogative that is always present in executive pow-
er.  As Lazar has argued with respect to emergency and normalcy, I 
argue that the relevant differences between prerogative and executive 
power are mainly differences of degree, not of kind.  This may help 
explain why there is so much imprecision in accounts of prerogative 
and executive power. 
Much of the legal and political scholarship has analyzed preroga-
tive within the framework of executive power.  As a consequence, the 
emphasis in these studies has been on the ways that prerogative devi-
ates from the rule of law and ordinary exercises of executive power.23  
But instead of looking to the nature of executive power to explain 
prerogative, it might be more instructive to view executive power in 
light of prerogative.  Perhaps prerogative is not an aberration from 
the way that executive power is normally exercised, but rather a radi-
                                                        
 18. NOMI CLAIRE LAZAR, STATES OF EMERGENCY IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 4–5 (2009). 
 19.  Id.   
 20.  Id. at 4.   
 21.  Id.  
 22.  Id. at 7. 
 23.  See, e.g., CORWIN, supra note 10, at 7–8; CLEMENT FATOVIC, OUTSIDE THE LAW: 
EMERGENCY AND EXECUTIVE POWER (2009) (examining the openness to exercises of extra-
legal prerogative in cases of emergency and the need for virtue in the Executive to inhibit 
abuse of prerogative); BENJAMIN A. KLEINERMAN, THE DISCRETIONARY PRESIDENT: THE 
PROMISE AND PERIL OF EXECUTIVE POWER (2009) (discussing the role discretionary execu-
tive power should play in the constitutional order); RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY 44–88 (1979); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its 
Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1796 (2010). 
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calized or heightened expression of executive power that manifests 
the informal and discretionary elements that are latent in even the 
most formal and constrained instances of executive power.  Instead of 
thinking about executive power as a distinct category, it might be bet-
ter to think of it as being on a spectrum that ranges from the least to 
the most discretionary, or from the most to the least rule-bound. 
Conceptualizing executive power as being continuous with pre-
rogative may help explain why legal and political thinkers have had 
such difficulty in pinning down the meaning of executive power.24  By 
viewing prerogative as being different in degree rather than in kind, 
we might be in a better position to begin understanding why the con-
cept of executive power has been so elusive.  As revealed in the follow-
ing survey of political thought from Locke to the Founding, it was dif-
ficult for early theorists to explain the formal features of executive 
power without reintroducing the informal elements of prerogative 
that their political and constitutional theories were otherwise de-
signed to eliminate.  The indeterminacy of the concept of executive 
power may help us understand why it has been so easy for executive 
power to expand in terms of its functions and the means at its dispos-
al.  The trend toward ever-greater expansions in executive power may 
be due, at least in part, to the possibility that there is an element of 
prerogative in all exercises of executive power. 
I.  LAW AND THE PARADOX OF EXECUTIVE POWER 
Every exercise of executive power is simultaneously rule-bound 
and discretionary.  Sometimes the applicable rules themselves allow 
or invite some forms of discretion even as they seek to curb or prevent 
other forms of discretion.  Some rules are more flexible than others 
and might even be better described as standards or as principles.25  
But in all cases, the very act of following a rule involves an act of in-
terpretation that is always to some degree discretionary.  No matter 
how formal and specific the rules may be, they are never self-
interpreting or self-enforcing.  As the philosopher Ludwig Wittgen-
stein suggested, no rule ever determines a particular course of action 
                                                        
 24.  For a review and example of the indeterminacy of accounts of executive power, 
see HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, JR., TAMING THE PRINCE: THE AMBIVALENCE OF MODERN 
EXECUTIVE POWER 1–3 (1993). 
 25.  Cass R. Sunstein argues that “[t]here is a continuum” of law from strict “rules to 
untrammeled discretion, with factors, standards, and guidelines falling in between.”  For a 
discussion of these distinctions, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL 
CONFLICT 21 (1996). 
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because every rule is susceptible to different interpretations.26  Discre-
tion is not the exception, but the rule, so to speak.  The upshot is that 
the rule of law (to the extent that it is conceptualized as the rule of 
formal laws)27 is an ideal that is never fully realized in practice.28  Like 
executive power, it is a matter of degree.  To be sure, rules themselves 
sometimes define the space within which the Executive is authorized 
to exercise discretion, but there is always a possibility of discretion 
that exceeds a formal allowance. 
This points to the paradox of executive power: Every attempt to 
augment the law has the potential to augment the power of the Exec-
utive, as well.  Throughout the history of legal and political thought, it 
has often been assumed that increases in the law would contribute to 
decreases in discretion.  Increases in either the number or the speci-
ficity of laws were expected to constrain, if not eliminate, discretion-
ary action.  That has been one of the main justifications for the rule of 
law dating back to Aristotle, if not earlier.29  The expectation of re-
formers has been that juridification would promote rule of law values 
such as predictability, uniformity, and accountability; but that is not 
always the case.  Instead of curtailing the discretion of the Executive, 
the proliferation of law actually has the potential to increase the dis-
cretion of the Executive. 
Of course, much of the juridification that has occurred, especial-
ly since World War II, has been specifically designed to augment the 
wartime and emergency powers of the Executive, both in the United 
States and elsewhere.30  As a result, prerogative in the strictest 
                                                        
 26.  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 80–82 (G.E.M. 
Anscombe trans., Blackwell Publishers, Ltd. 1953). 
 27.  See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 
1176–80 (1989) (arguing that law “made” by courts should establish general rules as op-
posed to leaving ample discretion to lower courts); Robert S. Summers, A Formal Theory of 
the Rule of Law, 6 RATIO JURIS 127, 128 (1993) (contending that “the rule of law is best 
conceptualized as a relatively circumscribed formal theory”). 
 28.  Ernest Weinrib, The Intelligibility of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR 
IDEOLOGY 59 (Allan C. Hutchison & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987); Timothy A. O. Endicott, 
The Impossibility of the Rule of Law, 19 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1 (1999). 
 29.  ARISTOTLE,  THE POLITICS 124 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (c. 
384 B.C.E.).  See also A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 188 (10th ed. 1961).  
 30.  There is also a tendency toward forms of juridification that constrain behavior in 
those areas where the exercise of power is expected to be most discretionary, namely in 
the realm of military and foreign affairs.  The development of what critics call “lawfare,” 
which constitutes an attempt to subject military decisions and tactics to legal constraints, 
actually illustrates how easy it is to move along the continuum between less rule-bound and 
more rule-bound action.  On the development and growth of lawfare in recent U.S. histo-
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Lockean sense may now seem obsolete.  That is, statutory delegations 
of authority make it unnecessary for the Executive to act outside the 
law when the law gives executives almost all the power they would 
want or need in order to deal with an emergency.31  For instance, sev-
eral major acts passed by Congress since 9-11, including the Authori-
zation for Use of Military Force32 (“AUMF”) and the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 2008,33 provided sweeping grants of 
authority to the executive branch.  These laws confer so much discre-
tion on the Executive that the practical differences (if not the legal 
status) between Lockean prerogative and action taken in accordance 
with these laws are difficult to discern.  The vast discretionary powers 
that have been delegated to the Executive make the line between pre-
rogative and rule-based executive action blurrier than ever. 
But executive power can also expand in unintended ways, even in 
those areas where legislators have sought to bring it under greater le-
gal control.  The War Powers Resolution of 197334 (“Resolution”) ex-
emplifies the paradoxical quality of executive power.  The purpose of 
the legislation was to limit the war powers of the President after the 
misadventures in Vietnam and Cambodia, but it has had the opposite 
effect.  Even though the law was designed to rein in the power of the 
President to deploy military forces abroad, it has actually done more 
to expand than to contract those powers.  The Resolution stipulates 
that the President must withdraw the armed forces of the United 
States from military engagements within ninety days of notifying Con-
gress if Congress has not authorized continued military engagement 
or “is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack upon 
the United States.”35  Despite the intentions of lawmakers, the actual 
effect was to expand those very same powers by sanctioning unilateral 
war-making by the President for up to ninety days.36 
                                                        
ry, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 9, at 58–64; JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE 
ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11, at 223–33 (2012). 
 31.  Some of these trends are documented in ROSSITER, supra note 11, at 217–22; 
GROSS & NÍ AOLÁIN, supra note 12, at 35–85.  See also Clement Fatovic & Benjamin 
Kleinerman, Introduction: Extra-Legal Measures and the Problem of Legitimacy, in EXTRA-LEGAL 
POWER AND LEGITIMACY: PERSPECTIVES ON PREROGATIVE (Oxford Univ. Press, forthcom-
ing).  
 32.  Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 33.  Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008). 
 34.  Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (1999)). 
 35.  50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2006). 
 36.  LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 145 (2d rev. ed. 2004). 
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The Freedom of Information Act of 196637 (“FOIA”) is another 
example of a law designed to limit executive power that ends up, in 
fact, augmenting it.  The purpose of FOIA was to make government 
documents and information more readily available to the public.38  
However, FOIA also carved out nine areas that would be exempt from 
its requirements.39  Congress defined the criteria for eight of these 
exemptions, but it left it up to the President to determine what doc-
uments should “be kept secret in the interest of national defense or 
foreign policy.”40  As a result, FOIA—a statute that was intended to 
expand public access to information—had the effect of giving the 
President almost total control over certain classes of information.41  In 
1982, President Ronald Reagan took advantage of this provision to is-
sue an executive order that imposed new and expanded classification 
requirements, undid declassification procedures that had been or-
dered by President Jimmy Carter, and allowed agencies to classify in-
formation that had already been made available to the public.42  Alt-
hough President Bill Clinton issued an executive order in 1995 that 
undid many of these policies to make the classification system more 
consistent with the intentions of the legislators who created FOIA,43 
his reversal did not change the fact that FOIA allows each president to 
decide unilaterally how much and what kinds of information the pub-
lic is able to access.44 
Even laws that do not directly address the powers of the President 
have the potential to augment those powers for reasons completely 
unrelated to increases in the size or budget of the administrative 
agencies under the control of the executive branch.45  The enactment 
                                                        
 37. Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2012)).  
 38.  Id. 
 39.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006). 
 40.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 41.  KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 155–56 (2001). 
 42.  Exec. Order No. 12,356, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,874 (Apr. 6, 1982) (Reagan). 
 43.  Exec. Order No. 12,958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 20, 1995) (Clinton). 
 44.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2006). 
 45.  Of course, the tremendous growth of the administrative state during the twentieth 
century has created opportunities for the exercise of discretionary powers by bureaucratic 
officials that are never fully under the control of the President.  Even as the number of of-
ficials and responsibilities that fall within the President’s purview has increased dramatical-
ly, the President’s ability to exert control over administrative agencies has failed to keep 
pace.  For a classic critique of this problem, see James Q. Wilson, The Rise of the Bureaucratic 
State, 41 NAT’L AFF. 77 (1975).   
FatovicFinalBookProofNew 11/6/2013  2:21 PM 
24 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:15 
of new laws creates new opportunities for the exercise of executive 
power, and the enactment of laws in new areas opens up new areas for 
the expansion of executive power.  The requirement to enforce the 
law is, of course, an invitation to exercise executive power.  But how 
that power is exercised depends, in the first instance, on how the law 
is interpreted.  Interpretation is a power that should not be underes-
timated, especially in light of the fact that the Executive gets to act on 
that interpretation before any court offers its own opinion.46  More of-
ten than not, courts will defer to the interpretation offered by the Ex-
ecutive.47 
It is also worth bearing in mind that any decision on how to en-
force or apply the law always presupposes an antecedent decision 
whether to enforce and apply the law in specific cases.  The constitu-
tional requirement that the President “shall take Care that the Laws 
be faithfully executed”48 has not prevented presidents from enforcing 
particular laws in a highly selective manner—or not at all.49  Steven G. 
Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo observe that presidents throughout 
the nation’s history have exercised a form of prosecutorial discretion 
in their enforcement of particular laws.50  They cite numerous exam-
ples of George Washington, John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, Andrew 
Jackson, and other presidents ceasing prosecutions against specific 
individuals.51  In at least one of these cases, the order to halt prosecu-
tions was motivated by strong disapproval of the laws on which they 
were based.52  The infamous Sedition Act of 179853 provided that on-
going prosecutions could continue even after the law expired (the 
day before the new President took office), but President Jefferson or-
dered an end to all prosecutions brought under that law, a law he ve-
hemently opposed from its beginnings based on political and consti-
tutional grounds.54 
                                                        
 46.  Geoffrey P. Miller, The President’s Power of Interpretation: Implications of a Unified The-
ory of Constitutional Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 35–38 (1993). 
 47.  David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 
113, 126–27 (1993). 
 48.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 49.  Miller, supra note 46, at 56. 
 50.  STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 49–51, 60–61, 67, 103 (2008). 
 51.  Id.  
 52.  Id. at 67. 
 53. Act of July 14, 1798 (Sedition Act), Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798). 
 54.  CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 50, at 67. 
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The use of signing statements, which dates back to the admin-
istration of James Monroe,55 provides another example of how the 
President’s responsibility to execute the law becomes the basis for as-
sertions of power that may be contrary to the law.  More specifically, 
presidents have issued signing statements declaring their refusal to 
implement the law in the manner prescribed by Congress.  Signing 
statements are often based on—or at least state—constitutional objec-
tions to provisions in legislation, especially to congressional assertions 
of the legislative veto, infringements on executive privilege, and other 
perceived encroachments on the President’s powers and privileges.56  
Presidents, however, have also used signing statements to pursue ob-
jectives that have little to do with protecting the constitutional powers 
of the office.  They have used signing statements to indicate approval 
of legislation, to provide guidance to officials responsible for imple-
menting the legislation, to express the President’s own interpretation 
of legislation, and to announce limits on the actual enforcement of 
legislation.57  One of the most notable and controversial signing 
statements in recent history was the one that President George W. 
Bush issued in response to the 2006 Department of Defense Appro-
priations bill.58  President Bush’s signing statement announced that 
the Executive would “construe” the provision of the bill restricting the 
use of certain interrogation methods on enemy combatants, better 
known as the McCain Amendment, “in a manner consistent with the 
constitutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary ex-
ecutive branch and as Commander in Chief.”59  Of course, presidents 
always claim that the law is on their side, even though there is no 
mention of anything like a power to issue signing statements any-
                                                        
 55.  Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W. Marshall, The Last Word: Presidential Power and the 
Role of Signing Statements, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 248, 253 (2008). 
 56.  Kevin A. Evans, Looking Before Watergate: Foundations in the Development of the Consti-
tutional Challenges Within Signing Statements, FDR-Nixon, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 390, 392–
94 (2012). 
 57.  PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE & ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE 
DIRECT ACTION 199–230 (2002).  Recent scholarship has argued that the majority of sign-
ing statements are used to establish “a dialogue between the president and Congress re-
garding the breadth of each institution’s powers.”  Ian Ostrander & Joel Sievert, What’s So 
Sinister About Presidential Signing Statements?, 43 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 58, 60 (2013).  Oth-
er scholars have argued that signing statements are largely rhetorical in function.  Christo-
pher S. Kelley et al., Assessing the Rhetorical Side of Presidential Signing Statements, 43 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 274, 274–76 (2013). 
 58.  Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, Emergency Supplemental Ap-
propriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act, 
2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918 (Dec. 30, 2005). 
 59.  Id.  
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where in the Constitution.60  In making these claims, presidents often 
rely on such expansive and controversial interpretations of their pow-
er that the lines between executive power and prerogative seem to 
disappear entirely.  Not only have presidents asserted the right to ig-
nore portions of the law, they have also sought to transform signing 
statements themselves into a kind of law.  In addition to treating past 
signing statements as precedents to justify presidential actions in the 
present, there have been successful attempts since the presidency of 
Ronald Reagan to enter signing statements into the legislative history 
of particular statutes.61 
Executive orders provide another means for presidents to modify 
the laws they are supposed to enforce.  The President’s ability to di-
rect executive agencies through these unilateral edicts is so similar to 
a legislative power that scholars have described it as a form of “execu-
tive lawmaking.”62  Throughout the history of the United States, pres-
idents have used executive orders to interpret and administer laws in 
ways that Congress may not have intended.63  A case in point is Execu-
tive Order 12,291, which President Reagan issued less than one 
month after he took office.64  Rather than asking Congress to make 
legislative changes to a regulatory system that the Administration 
deemed too onerous to business and stifling to the economy, Presi-
dent Reagan invoked “the authority vested in [him] as President by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States of America” to issue an 
executive order that would restrict the adoption and implementation 
of administrative rules and regulations that did not “maximize the net 
benefits to society.”65  Executive Order 12,291 required all executive 
                                                        
 60.  Article I, § 7 of the Constitution stipulates that a presidential veto must be accom-
panied by a statement of the President’s “Objections,” but it says nothing about issuing a 
statement that expresses the President’s approval or interpretation of a bill.  U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 7. 
 61.  COOPER, supra note 57, at 210–11. 
 62.  MAYER, supra note 41, at 16–22.  For a critique of executive lawmaking, see Louis 
Fisher, Laws Congress Never Made, 5 CONSTITUTION 59 (1993).  For the counterargument 
that executive orders are more likely to rely on persuasion rather than command, see An-
drew C. Rudalevige, The Contemporary Presidency: Executive Orders and Presidential Unilateral-
ism, 42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 138 (2012). 
 63.  Of course, efforts to direct agencies to act in ways that conflict with the ostensible 
intentions of lawmakers do not always succeed—and may even trigger heightened levels of 
legislative oversight.  Scott H. Ainsworth, et al., Congressional Response to Presidential Signing 
Statements, 40 AM. POL. RES. 1067, 1068 (2012).  But successful or not, these attempts do 
indicate something about the way that presidents understand their own powers and what 
they think they can accomplish. 
 64.  Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981). 
 65. Id. § 2(c), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13, 193. 
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agencies to use cost-benefit analyses to justify the promulgation of any 
new regulations and stipulated that “[r]egulatory action shall not be 
undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation 
outweigh the potential costs to society.”66  The Administration de-
fended its authority to issue this order on the grounds that executive 
power includes the ability to control all executive agencies; but critics 
have argued that the order violated the law concerning the rulemak-
ing process laid out in the Administrative Procedures Act of 1946.67  
Despite complaints that this and other executive orders issued by Re-
publican and Democratic presidents alike have defied the intent of 
legislators, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has done much 
to reverse these decisions. 
It is well known that external shocks, including invasions, insur-
rections, and other emergencies create opportunities for the exercise 
and expansion of presidential war powers.  As James Madison famous-
ly warned, “In war, too, the discretionary power of the Executive is ex-
tended; its influence in dealing out offices, honors, and emoluments 
is multiplied; and all the means of seducing the minds, are added to 
those of subduing the force, of the people.”68  The possibility that ex-
ecutive power will start to look more and more like prerogative is 
most obvious in the President’s direct handling of war and other 
emergencies.  This was evident in the way that the Bush Administra-
tion prosecuted the so-called War on Terror.  The Bush Administra-
tion ordered the National Security Agency to conduct warrantless 
wiretaps on electronic communications between persons in the Unit-
ed States and those located in other countries, classified hundreds of 
prisoners as “enemy combatants” in order to detain them in prisons 
indefinitely, and authorized the use of “harsh” methods of interroga-
tion, including waterboarding, against suspected terrorists.  The 
Obama Administration has continued and even expanded some of 
these practices, most notably in its use of unmanned aerial drones to 
target suspected terrorists in Pakistan and other countries.69  Alt-
hough both Administrations justified these controversial policies in 
terms of the President’s constitutional war powers as commander in 
chief, critics have charged them with making legally questionable and 
                                                        
 66. Id. § 2(b), 46 Fed. Reg. at 13, 193. 
 67.  For additional information about the background and consequences of this order, 
including the debate it generated, see MAYER, supra note 41, at 126–31.  
 68.  JAMES MADISON, Political Observations, in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 485, 491 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).  
 69.  Mark Mazzetti & David E. Sanger, Obama Expands Missile Strikes Inside Pakistan, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 21, 2009, at A1. 
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tendentious assertions of power that might be better characterized as 
exercises of (unjustified) prerogative. 
Other areas of executive power, including ordinary law enforce-
ment, can begin to shade over into prerogative in these circumstanc-
es.  Ironically, the very same budget constraints brought on by emer-
gencies can provide opportunities for exercises of power that take on 
the character of prerogative.  The need to establish new spending 
priorities where resources are scarce can provide a convenient excuse 
for presidents to scale back the enforcement of laws that they never 
fully supported in the first place.  For instance, the need to shift addi-
tional law enforcement resources toward the fight against terrorism 
can be used by a pro-business administration to de-prioritize federal 
investigations and prosecutions of white-collar crime.  In the years 
leading up to the economic crisis of 2008, the business-friendly Bush 
Administration repeatedly denied requests by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation to devote more resources to the investigation of white-
collar crime on the grounds that counterterrorism had to remain a 
priority.  As a result, prosecutions of financial, securities, and insur-
ance fraud plummeted in the years after 9-11.70  If executive power 
strictly conformed to rule of law principles, such variations in law en-
forcement across different administrations would not exist. 
Apparent constraints can be turned to the President’s advantage 
outside the context of emergency, as well.  That is, instances of pre-
rogative, however small, emerge even in circumstances that present 
no immediate danger or urgency at all.  One of the most striking ex-
amples of executive discretion in recent memory is President 
Obama’s decision, in the summer of 2012, to suspend deportations of 
undocumented immigrants, no more than thirty years old, who came 
to the United States before the age of sixteen and had committed no 
major crimes.71  One of President Obama’s publicly stated justifica-
tions for his executive order illustrates how easy it is for executive 
power to expand as a result of constraints, and not just delegations, of 
authority.  He claimed that budget constraints made it impossible for 
him to carry out all deportations possible under the law, so he was 
forced to establish priorities that would leave some individuals free 
                                                        
 70.  Eric Lichtblau, David Johnston & Ron Nixon, F.B.I. Struggles to Handle Financial 
Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, http:www.nytimes.com/2008/10/19/washington/ 
19fbi.html?_r=0&pagewanted=all. 
 71.  Julia Preston & John H. Cushman, Jr., Obama to Permit Young Migrants to Remain in 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/1012/06/16/us/us-to-
stop-deporting-some-illegal-immigrants.html?pagewanted=all&pagewanted=print. 
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from deportation.  The fact that this was a convenient pretext that al-
lowed the President to achieve a desired policy outcome he could not 
secure in an obstructionist Congress does not mean that he was lying 
when he said that budgetary limitations forced him to set priorities.  
But it does serve to demonstrate that even ostensible constraints on 
the Executive can provide opportunities for exercises of power that 
call to mind prerogative, as critics were quick to point out.72 
In the past two hundred plus years, much of the tremendous 
growth in executive power has been the result of statutory delega-
tions.73  Of course, congressional delegations of authority to the Pres-
ident are formally grounded in law (though whether these delega-
tions are always consistent with the Constitution is another matter).  It 
has been unnecessary for the Executive to act “without the prescrip-
tion of the Law” because the law itself has been the source of vast new 
powers.  This would seem to suggest that it is unhelpful and even mis-
leading to examine executive power in terms of Lockean prerogative. 
In the following section, however, I argue that both delegations 
of authority and exercises of extra-legal power are made possible by 
the inherent ambiguity of the concept of executive power.  To the ex-
tent that the contemporary presidency fits this description of an ex-
ecutive whose powers are never wholly specified in law, it reflects the 
indeterminacy of the concept of executive power itself.  The decep-
tively simple language of the vesting clause74 conceals the deep confu-
sion that surrounded early debates over the meaning of executive 
power.  Not only was it extremely difficult for writers dealing with ex-
ecutive power to avoid addressing prerogative, it was also difficult for 
them to avoid adding heterogeneous functions and responsibilities 
that went well beyond mere enforcement of the law.  In Federalist No. 
48, James Madison warned of the dangers of a legislative “vortex” that 
would suck all powers into itself,75 but it turns out that ambiguity in 
the meaning of executive power has created a vacuum that is just as 
powerful. 
                                                        
 72.  For instance, Representative Steve King of Iowa accused President Obama of 
“planning to usurp the constitutional authority of the United States Congress.” M.J. Lee, 
Obama: No Deportation of Some Young Illegal Immigrants, POLITICO, June 15, 2012, available at 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0612/77464.html.  
 73.  THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES 7 (2d ed. 1979). 
 74.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 75.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
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II. DEFINING EXECUTIVE POWER 
During the founding of the United States, Americans who looked 
to influential works of legal and political theory for guidance in un-
derstanding the nature and limits of executive power could very well 
have come away more confused than enlightened.  One of the most 
remarkable features of these accounts is that the writers often provid-
ed much more detailed and sustained discussions of prerogative than 
of executive power per se.  Though these normative and descriptive 
accounts of prerogative sometimes differed quite significantly from 
one another, depending on how closely these writers followed British 
precedents and usage in referring to the range of powers and privi-
leges associated with royal power, these discussions were strikingly 
uniform in their reticence on the meaning of executive power.  To be 
sure, they often identified similar sets of foreign and domestic re-
sponsibilities, but they never attempted to explain why, for instance, 
the power to appoint ministers and the power to grant pardons could 
both be classified as executive powers.  The explanation for why the 
same institutional body should exercise such seemingly different 
powers was almost always numerical.  Aside from their contingent his-
torical association in European monarchies throughout the ages, cer-
tain powers over war and peace, diplomacy, the administration of jus-
tice, and other areas were lumped together because, it was said, they 
could be more effectively exercised by “one” than by “many.”  Of 
course, the idea of a unitary executive who could act quickly and deci-
sively because he or she could act unilaterally rested on a fiction that 
ignored the Executive’s institutional and administrative reliance on a 
variety of other actors to help formulate and carry out the Executive’s 
supposedly unified will.76  “Executive power” was never presented as a 
coherent or discrete concept.  Instead, it came to stand for a hodge-
podge of heterogeneous powers and responsibilities. 
The complicated relationship between law and executive power 
in modern political thought received one of its earliest and best artic-
                                                        
 76.  If the idea of a unitary executive was just simplistic at the dawn of the modern era, 
it is plainly wrong now that government agencies, nominally headed by the chief executive, 
have become sprawling and labyrinthine structures with multiple power centers that can 
resist top-down control.  For a critique of the idea that the Executive’s singleness still af-
fords great institutional advantages, see WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 26–44 (2004).  See also Clement Fatovic, Filling the 
Void: Democratic Deliberation and the Legitimization of Extra-Legal Action, in EXTRA-LEGAL 
POWER AND LEGITIMACY: PERSPECTIVES ON PREROGATIVE (Clement Fatovic & Benjamin 
Kleinerman eds., forthcoming). 
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ulations in John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government.77  Along with 
conformity to natural law and the consent of the governed, Locke 
pronounced strict adherence to the rule of law as an essential criteri-
on of legitimate government.78  The existence of publicly promulgat-
ed, settled, standing laws that regulate the actions of governors and 
governed alike would eliminate the need for the exercise of arbitrary 
powers inherently inimical to liberty.79  As Locke explained of the 
powers of government in general: 
 [I]t ought to be exercised by established and promulgated 
Laws: that both the People may know their Duty, and be safe 
and secure within the limits of the Law, and the Rulers too 
kept within their due bounds, and not to be tempted, by the 
Power they have in their hands, to imploy it to such purpos-
es, and by such measures, as they would not have known, 
and own not willingly.80 
As a further means of protecting liberty and in order to give insti-
tutional effect to this vision of the rule of law, Locke introduced an 
early version of the separation of powers based on a functional dis-
tinction between legislative, executive, and federative responsibili-
ties.81  Legislative power is relatively straightforward: it consists of an 
assembly of persons and makes the laws that regulate those inside and 
outside government.82  Because it is unnecessary for the Legislature 
always to be engaged in lawmaking, it is unnecessary for the legislative 
assembly always to be in session.83  But neither executive power nor 
federative power is so straightforward.  At first, executive power is de-
fined by the power to enforce the laws enacted by the Legislature.84  
However, it immediately becomes joined with the federative power, 
an all-purpose power in foreign affairs that “contains the Power of 
War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and all the Transactions, with 
all Persons and Communities without the Commonwealth.”85  The 
main reason for combining these very different responsibilities in the 
same institution is that both require “the force of the Society for their 
                                                        
 77.  LOCKE, supra note 1, at 285–446. 
 78.  Id. at 373–79. 
 79.  Id. at 376–78. 
 80.  Id. at 378.  
 81.  Id. at 382–84. 
 82.  Id. at 382. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. at 382–83. 
 85.  Id. at 383. 
FatovicFinalBookProofNew 11/6/2013  2:21 PM 
32 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:15 
exercise,” something that is much more effectively deployed by a sin-
gle set of hands than by a diverse—and potentially divided—set of 
hands.86 
Despite Locke’s repeated insistence that the executive and feder-
ative powers are analytically “distinct,” it quickly becomes apparent 
that Locke is unable to maintain the lines between them.  While ex-
ecutive power is supposed to revolve around the law, federative power 
“is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive 
Laws, than the Executive; and so must necessarily be left to the Pru-
dence and Wisdom of those whose hands it is in.”87  As it turns out, 
however, executive power also comprehends matters that cannot be 
fully guided by the law.  Though the laws to be enforced may be set-
tled, the means and methods employed to enforce them are not.  In 
this respect, the execution of municipal laws in the commonwealth 
resembles the execution of natural laws in the state of nature.  That is, 
a great deal is left to discretion.  Some means are proscribed by the 
rules of morality, but individuals exercising executive power (whether 
they are private individuals in the state of nature or executive officers 
in the commonwealth) enjoy considerable leeway in how and even 
whether they enforce the laws.  In both instances, the law must be in-
terpreted to be applied, and it must be decided whether the public 
good is better served by strict or by selective enforcement of the law. 
This view of matters was not just theoretical for Locke.  Years be-
fore he laid out these ideas in the Two Treatises of Government, Locke 
had to decide whether the king could justifiably suspend enforcement 
of laws against Dissenters who violated the Conventicle Act of 1664, 
which forbade nonconformists from assembling in groups of five or 
larger.  The First Earl of Shaftesbury, Anthony Ashley Cooper, asked 
Locke to draft a formal recommendation that he could pass on to 
Charles II.  Even though Locke and Shaftesbury (who would go on to 
become a founder of the Whig party) opposed expansions of execu-
tive power, they ended up endorsing the king’s declaration of an Act 
of Indulgence.88  Locke’s support for the policy of toleration out-
weighed his opposition to royal prerogative (here understood as the 
ability to suspend the law).  In Locke’s view, the public good—and the 
                                                        
 86.  Id. at 384. 
 87.  Id.  
 88.  FATOVIC, supra note 23, at 44–45. 
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right of individual conscience—would be better served by deviation 
from the strict letter of the law than by rigid adherence to it.89 
In his discussion of prerogative, in Two Treaties of Government, 
Locke makes his reasoning explicit.  Prerogative actually receives far 
more space and attention in The Second Treatise than does executive 
power, getting its own chapter, not to mention several other substan-
tial discussions.90  As Locke explains, it is necessary to place the power 
of prerogative somewhere because “it is impossible to foresee, and so 
by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities, that may concern 
the publick.”91  It is introduced as if it were a categorically distinct 
form of power, but it actually turns out to be an extraordinary form of 
executive power.  This is not simply because prerogative “must neces-
sarily be left to the discretion of him, that has the Executive Power in 
his hands” for the very practical reason that whoever wields the entire 
force of the community in times of normalcy is best equipped to wield 
it in times of emergency, as well.92  Rather, it is because the power to 
execute the laws also entails the power not to execute the laws.  In a 
sense, the only actor in a position to determine that “the municipal 
Law has given no direction” in a particular case is the actor most di-
rectly responsible for the execution of that same law.93  In the final 
analysis, Locke’s discussion of prerogative tells us far more about the 
discretionary and potentially expansive nature of executive power 
than any of his more direct and rather mechanical accounts of execu-
tive power.  His theory of prerogative draws attention to the fact that 
executive power requires uses of discretion that exceed the law. 
Locke’s account of prerogative has received the lion’s share of at-
tention in recent (mainly post-9-11) scholarship on the topic.  Howev-
er, many of the liberal constitutional thinkers who explored the same 
theoretical territory followed closely in his footsteps when it came to 
executive power. 
No thinker was cited more frequently in the years leading up to 
and immediately after the creation of the Constitution than the 
French philosopher Montesquieu.94  His famous, and famously wrong, 
                                                        
 89.  RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND LOCKE’S “TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT” 111–12 (1986). 
 90.  LOCKE, supra note 1, at 392–98. 
 91.  Id. at 393. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 392. 
 94.  On the frequency of citations to Montesquieu compared to other influential writ-
ers, see DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 142–46 (1988). 
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account of the separation of powers in the English Constitution 
taught generations of readers the importance of countervailing 
checks and balances in the preservation of liberty.  But for all the at-
tention and acclaim Montesquieu’s account has received, it had re-
markably little to say about executive power.  His major innovation 
was to separate the power to punish crimes and judge disputes be-
tween individuals (or what would become known as the judicial pow-
er) from the power to conduct foreign and military affairs.95  Montes-
quieu devoted considerably more space, however, to the composition 
of the Executive, contributing to the chorus of writers singing the 
praises of a single executive, than to the actual powers or responsibili-
ties of the Executive.  What is perhaps most surprising about his brief 
remarks on executive power, in light of his reputation as a champion 
of the separation of powers, is that Montesquieu dismissed the idea of 
legislative checks on the Executive as unnecessary.  The reason, he 
suggested, is that the Executive’s preoccupation with “immediate 
things” serves as an inherent limit that obviates the need for legislative 
restraints.96  The implication that executive power is exercised on an 
ad hoc basis, responding to situations as they arise rather than creat-
ing them as the Legislature does, suggests that executive power re-
sponsibilities and duties cannot be specified in advance.  It is telling 
that in the brief space that Montesquieu devoted to executive power 
he would emphasize its informality. 
Much more instructive and influential on the subject of executive 
power was the great legal commentator William Blackstone.  Perhaps 
more than any writer other than David Hume (whose writings on ex-
ecutive power were principally historical studies of the English mon-
archs throughout the centuries rather than theoretical reflections on 
the concept of executive power per se), Blackstone had a fair amount 
to say about the practice of executive power under the English Consti-
tution.  But when it came to the theory of executive power, his reflec-
tions focused primarily on the topic of prerogative.97  A good deal of 
this discussion dealt with prerogatives in the plural.98  These were very 
specific and exclusive privileges, powers, and rights that English mon-
archs enjoyed as a matter of law.99  Some of these pertained to the 
                                                        
 95.  MONTESQUIEU: THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 156–57 (Anne M. Cohler, Basia C. Miller 
& Harold S. Stone eds. & trans., 1989). 
 96.  Id. at 162. 
 97.  WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *230–70. 
 98.  Id. at *232–70. 
 99.  Id. at *232. 
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unique character and income of the king, but Blackstone did not con-
sider these prerogatives to be an essential part of executive power.100  
In his view, there was an entirely separate branch of prerogatives “in 
the exertion whereof consists the executive part of government.”101  It 
is in this part of his lengthy chapter on the king’s prerogative that 
Blackstone invoked Locke’s extra-legal conception of prerogative to 
elaborate on the ways that executive power exceeds the law.102 
Blackstone’s account of executive power is complicated by his 
general definition of law as a “rule of action, which is prescribed by 
some superior, and which the inferior is bound to obey.”103  One 
complication peculiar to the English case (as Blackstone presented it) 
is that the monarch is sovereign and therefore not directly subject to 
any other earthly power.104  But another much more significant com-
plication for the theory of executive power in general is that it does 
not easily lend itself to rules of action.  Despite his insistence that the 
settlement reached by the Glorious Revolution had limited the king’s 
powers “by bounds so certain and notorious, that it is impossible he 
should exceed them without the consent of the people,”105 Blackstone 
went on to acknowledge that the powers of the king were still quite 
significant but “not perhaps so open and avowed as they formerly 
were.”106  The unprecedented reforms that helped to secure the peo-
ple in their liberty eliminated arbitrary power of the sort that made 
the Stuart reigns so odious, but they did not do away with either dis-
cretionary power or the need to exercise extra-legal power.  Indeed, 
Blackstone’s account of executive power calls into question his claim 
that England is a land governed entirely by law.  Just before he explic-
itly introduced Locke into the discussion, Blackstone echoed the phi-
losopher’s claims about the inherent limitations of the law, reminding 
readers “how impossible it is, in any practical system of laws, to point 
out beforehand those eccentrical remedies, which the sudden emer-
gence of national distress may dictate, and which that alone can justi-
fy.”107 
                                                        
 100.  Id. at *233. 
 101.  Id. at *242. 
 102.  Id. at *244. 
 103.  Id. at *38. 
 104.  Id. at *234–35. 
 105.  Id. at *137. 
 106.  Id. at *324. 
 107.  Id. at *244. 
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Blackstone did not elaborate at much greater length on preroga-
tive in the Lockean sense, but the discussion that immediately fol-
lowed his remarks on the limitations of the law went on to survey a va-
riety of powers and responsibilities that cannot easily be codified into 
law.108  The powers Blackstone addressed in this part of his chapter 
were not obsolete practices or traditions peculiar to England, as were 
many of the ones he addressed in the first part of his chapter.  In fact, 
they consisted mainly (though not entirely) of those powers that con-
tinue to inform contemporary understandings of executive power 
(along with a few important exceptions).  These powers, which are 
broadly divided into foreign and domestic matters, include the pow-
ers to send and receive ambassadors, form treaties with foreign pow-
ers, make war and peace, issue letters of marque and reprisal, grant 
safe conduct to merchants and those in distress, veto legislation, 
maintain domestic order and guarantee safe travel, establish courts of 
justice, grant pardons, bestow honors, regulate commerce, and gov-
ern the established church.109  Both the placement and the content of 
Blackstone’s discussion indicate that the exercise of these powers 
cannot be fully constrained or guided by law.  The latitude associated 
with many of these powers is determined largely by the objects they 
concern.  Most of these powers concern matters that do not necessari-
ly lend themselves to rule-making, so the Executive is compelled to 
rely on ad hoc decision-making.  Emergencies are a case in point.  But 
even the administration of justice, which is more rule-bound than 
these other areas, sometimes requires case-by-case judgments.  As the 
list also indicates, executive power becomes a repository for those re-
sponsibilities that cannot easily be carried out by other parts of the 
government.  With each additional function and responsibility, the 
Executive acquires new opportunities for the exercise of the very dis-
cretion that England’s vaunted rule of law was supposed to curb. 
The primacy of law in the English system was a major attraction 
to foreign admirers.  In The Constitution of England, Swiss political and 
constitutional theorist Jean-Louis de Lolme described the king as a 
magistrate bound to the law as equally as his subjects.110  De Lolme’s 
most significant contribution to debates over executive power in 
America was his highly influential argument that a single executive is 
more responsible than a plural executive because it is much easier to 
                                                        
 108.  Id. at *244–70. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  JEAN-LOUIS DE LOLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND; OR, AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
ENGLISH GOVERNMENT 67 (Baldwyn & Co., 1821). 
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hold a wrongdoer accountable when responsibility cannot be deflect-
ed or diffused among a number of actors.  De Lolme, however, never 
bothered to offer a definition or general explanation of executive 
power.  Instead, he identified a heterogeneous assortment of powers 
and functions belonging to the English king in the administration of 
justice (including the powers to punish and pardon), as the “fountain 
of honour” in dispensing titles and awards, as the “superintendent of 
commerce,” as the head of the Church of England, as “generalissimo” 
of all military forces, as the representative of the nation in foreign af-
fairs, and as the executor of the laws.111  Like Blackstone, de Lolme 
noted that the king’s prerogatives had been constrained by law.  
However, unlike the English commentator, the Swiss writer brought 
an outsider’s objectivity and candor in noting that legal limits on the 
king’s authority were far less effective (if at all) than parliamentary 
control over the purse-strings and the power to impeach the king’s 
ministers.112  In what turned out to be his final word on the subject of 
executive power in his widely read book, de Lolme criticized the legal-
istic tendencies of the English for obscuring a truth about executive 
power in general:  
 In all monarchies (and it is the same in republics), the ex-
ecutive power in the state is supposed to possess, originally 
and by itself, all manner of lawful authority: every one of its 
exertions is deemed to be legal: and they do not cease to be 
so, till they are stopped by some express and positive regula-
tion.113 
III.  THE QUESTION OF EXECUTIVE POWER AT THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION AND BEYOND 
At the time of the American Revolution, Americans were deeply 
suspicious of and hostile to executive power.114  Not only did they as-
sociate executive power with monarchical forms of government, they 
also questioned how compatible it was with republican ideals and the 
rule of law.  For that reason, the state constitutions drafted immedi-
                                                        
 111.  Id. at 67–69.  In another section of his book, de Lolme remarked that the “true 
constitutional office” of the king was “the countenancing, and supporting with its strength, 
the execution of the laws.”  Id. at 351.  
 112.  Id. at 78. 
 113.  Id. at 381–82 (emphasis added). 
 114.  See, e.g., CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789: A 
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2007); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776–1787, at 148–50 (1969) (noting the “awful fear” that eight-
eenth-century Americans held toward magisterial authority). 
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ately after the break with England created very weak executive 
branches,115 and the Articles of Confederation established no execu-
tive department at all.  Statements from this period suggest that 
Americans were not entirely sure what executive power actually 
meant, but they knew it was dangerous.  In many state constitutions, 
there was “a great indefiniteness in the definitions of executive pow-
er.”116  It was not long before Americans began to realize that effective 
government could not do without more powerful executives than they 
had initially allowed.  Many states began to revise their constitutions 
to establish governors with stronger powers and national leaders 
clamored for significant changes to the Articles of Confederation, in-
cluding the creation of an independent executive branch. 
The leading delegates to the Constitutional Convention knew 
that any changes they recommended to the existing system of gov-
ernment would have to include a provision for an independent exec-
utive, but they did not necessarily know what its powers would be, how 
it would be composed, how it would be selected, or how long its term 
would be.  In fact, many of them had absolutely no idea what execu-
tive power even meant.  According to the historian Richard Beeman, 
who has written the authoritative account of the Constitutional Con-
vention, “the nature of presidential power was among the most con-
founding subjects they faced all summer.”117 
The delegates to the Philadelphia Convention generally believed 
that it would be possible to specify the jurisdiction of both the legisla-
tive and the judicial branches.  Although some delegates—most nota-
bly Gouverneur Morris and Alexander Hamilton—expected provi-
sions such as the “necessary and proper” clause and the “general 
welfare” clause to provide rather open-ended grants of power to Con-
gress, most delegates expected the Legislature’s powers to be limited 
mainly to those specific (and sometimes not-so-specific) powers that 
were enumerated in Article I, Section 8.118  Likewise, delegates ex-
                                                        
 115.  WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 271–75 (1980). 
 116.  THACH, supra note 114, at 17.  
 117.  RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 124–143, 230 (2009) (describing the early debates over the executive 
branch at the Convention). 
 118.  Of course, there is considerable debate among scholars as to whether the Consti-
tution actually limits Congress to those powers expressly enumerated and whether mem-
bers of the founding generation themselves understood the Constitution as limiting Con-
gress in this way.  On the claim that Article I, Section 8 was intended to limit Congress to 
those powers expressly enumerated, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST 
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004).  For a more mixed assessment, see 
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pected the court’s jurisdiction to be limited to those areas specified in 
Article III, Section 2.  But it was never entirely clear either to the del-
egates at the Philadelphia Convention or to the delegates at the vari-
ous state ratifying conventions what would fall within the President’s 
jurisdiction.  To be sure, Article II, Section 2 enumerated a variety of 
functions and responsibilities, from the power to grant reprieves and 
pardons to the power to make treaties with the advice and consent of 
the Senate.119  Although some of these specifically enumerated pow-
ers—especially the President’s powers as commander in chief—gave 
the President enormous powers, they did little to explain the most 
basic functions of the Executive.  Neither the text of Article II, Section 
2 nor the debates leading up to its adoption tell us exactly what exec-
utive power means or what it allows the President to do. 
Like every other part of the Constitution, Article II was the result 
of numerous compromises and bargains struck throughout the sum-
mer of 1787.  The story of the Convention’s struggles over the Execu-
tive are well known: any decision reached on one aspect of the Execu-
tive (for example, whether to have one person or more hold this 
power, whether to have an executive council, whether to make the 
President re-eligible, whether to allow the national legislature to se-
lect the Executive, whether to make the term of office relatively short, 
and so on) would invariably affect a decision on another aspect of the 
executive.  Indeed, the powers of the Executive (and those of the oth-
er branches of government) depended on the form of government, 
and vice versa.120  The Framers understood the trade-offs involved in 
these decisions.  But what they did not understand was what executive 
power actually means.  The more they debated the Executive, the 
more it dawned on many of them that the concept of executive power 
was inherently indeterminate. 
Questions about the meaning of executive power cropped up 
early at the Convention.  From the start, there was a general sense 
that executive power includes the power to execute or enforce the 
laws, but there was little agreement beyond that. During the first de-
bate over the Virginia Plan’s proposal to establish an independent ex-
ecutive, it quickly became apparent that many delegates conceived of 
executive power in terms of those prerogatives associated with the 
                                                        
JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER 
ORIGINAL INTENT (1999). 
 119.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 120.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787  300 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter RECORDS 2] (Nathaniel Gorham Remarks, Aug. 15, 1787). 
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British monarchy.  For that reason, many of them expressed grave 
concerns about placing executive power in one person.  In particular, 
these delegates feared that a single executive would end up having 
exclusive powers over war and peace.  A few delegates—including 
some of the most outspoken supporters of a strong national execu-
tive, such as James Wilson—tried to reassure their colleagues that 
“[t]he only powers [they] conceived strictly Executive were those of 
executing the laws, and appointing officers, not (appertaining to and) 
appointed by the Legislature.”121  These efforts to clarify the meaning 
of executive power failed to satisfy Edmund Randolph and other 
Framers who believed that it was inherently monarchical in nature, so 
James Madison offered an amendment that was designed to specify 
the powers of the Executive.  His proposal, however, did more to 
highlight the ambiguous (and therefore worrisome) nature of execu-
tive power.  He moved to clarify the powers of the Executive under 
the Virginia Plan by adding the words “with power to carry into execu-
tion the national laws,—to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise 
provided for; and to execute such powers, not legislative or judiciary 
in their nature, as may from time to time be delegated by the national 
legislature.”122  What is most remarkable about this motion is that the 
phrase “to execute such powers, not legislative or judiciary in their na-
ture,” would have marked out the powers of the Executive negatively.  
Madison took it for granted that the meanings of “legislative” and 
“judiciary” were fairly clear or well understood.  It seems that others 
did, as well.  In the end, the delegates accepted the first two clauses of 
Madison’s amendment, but they rejected the portion that would have 
granted the Executive powers that were neither legislative nor judi-
cial.123 
Ever the theoretician, Madison made several more attempts 
throughout the summer to nail down the meaning of executive pow-
er.  When others could not provide answers to his questions, he ven-
tured his own.  In a remark on the importance of keeping the differ-
ent powers separate and independent of each other, Madison noted 
certain similarities between the Executive and the Judiciary—both ex-
ecute the laws in certain cases and both interpret and apply the laws 
in certain cases:  
                                                        
 121.  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 66 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) 
[hereinafter RECORDS 1]. 
 122.  Id. at 63. 
 123.  Id. at  63–64. 
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 The difference between them seemed to consist chiefly in 
two circumstances—1. the collective interest & security were 
much more in the power belonging to the Executive than to 
the Judiciary department. 2. in the administration of the 
former much greater latitude is left to opinion and discre-
tion than in the administration of the latter.124   
Though Madison favored a strong national executive, he never 
went as far as Hamilton or Gouverneur Morris.  He came to realize 
that executive power has a natural tendency toward growth and ex-
pansion, especially in times of crisis.  At one point he declared, “In 
time of actual war, great discretionary powers are constantly given to 
the Executive Magistrate.”125 
Once the Convention agreed on some general principles for a 
new form of government, it appointed a Committee of Detail to pre-
pare a draft that reflected what they had achieved so far.  One of the 
main principles guiding the work of the Committee of Detail was 
“[t]o use simple and precise language, and general propositions” be-
cause a constitution was not to be construed in the same way as a 
law.126  The acknowledgment that a constitution differs fundamentally 
from an ordinary law (in terms of its longevity and its flexibility, 
among other things) can hardly be disputed, but the guidelines 
adopted were internally inconsistent.  There is a contradiction be-
tween the demand for “simple and precise language,” on the one 
hand, and the demand for “general propositions,” on the other hand.  
A general proposition may require the use of simple language, but it 
may also militate against the use of precise language.  In addition, the 
demand for “precise” language could come into direct conflict with 
the demand for “simple” language.  The Committee of Detail enu-
merated ten separate powers that the Executive (not yet designated 
the “President”) would possess under the principles that had been 
adopted to that point.  These included the powers to execute the na-
tional laws, to command the state militias and armed forces of the un-
ion, to discipline them, to direct the state governors to call the militias 
into service, to appoint officers, to veto legislation passed by the na-
tional legislature, to receive ambassadors, to commission officers, to 
                                                        
 124.  RECORDS 2, supra note 120, at 34. 
 125.  RECORDS 1, supra note 121, at 465. 
 126.  RECORDS 2, supra note 120, at 137. 
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convene the Legislature, and to grant pardons.127  The Committee of 
Detail, however, never made an attempt to define executive power.128 
The Convention never settled the meaning of executive power.  
Nor did all the delegates agree that the office they vested with this 
mysterious power had been adequately checked.  Even some of the 
eventual signers of the Constitution expressed worries that the office 
they created might someday evolve into a monarchical institution.  
The only thing that met the agreement (though certainly not the ap-
proval) of everyone—from the most outspoken proponent of a strong 
executive to the most suspicious critic of the presidency—was that the 
distinguishing characteristic of executive power was “energy.”  Indeed, 
as early as the second day of debate, the ever-vacillating Edmund 
Randolph had already insisted on “the absolute necessity of a more 
energetic government.”129  After Roger Sherman suggested that the 
Executive should be “nothing more than an institution for carrying 
the will of the Legislature into effect,” James Wilson immediately re-
minded his colleagues of the need for an energetic executive.130  
Throughout the rest of the summer, Wilson, Morris, Hamilton, and 
others invoked the concept of energy to explain what distinguished 
executive power from the rest of the government.  It was precisely the 
association of executive power with energy that led the non-signers 
Randolph and George Mason to suspect that the presidency would 
eventually morph into a monarchy. 
In many respects, energy was just as vague and elusive a concept 
as executive power.  No one offered anything approaching a clear or 
precise definition.  In fact, Madison offered an elaborate philosophi-
cal and linguistic justification for the unavoidable “obscurity” in the 
Constitution in the installment of the Federalist that contains his most 
                                                        
 127.  Id. at 145–46.  The draft confusingly includes twelve items under the “powers” of 
the Executive, including removability by impeachment and compensation for public ser-
vice.  Id. 
 128.  Thomas Paine would have no better luck in defining executive power for the 
French government than the Framers did in the American context.  Echoing the uncer-
tainty that had been expressed in Philadelphia, Paine wrote:  
[T]he meaning ordinarily assigned to the term, executive power, is indefinite, 
and, consequently, our conception of it is by no means so exact and plain as 
when we speak of legislative power.  It is associated, some way or other, in our 
minds with the idea of arbitrary power, and thus a feeling of suspicion rather 
than of confidence is aroused.   
THOMAS PAINE, Answer to Four Questions on the Legislative and Executive Powers, in 2 THE 
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 521, 523 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1945). 
 129.  RECORDS 1, supra note 121, at 24. 
 130.  Id. at 65. 
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extensive use of the term “energy.”  Responding to widespread criti-
cisms that the Constitution was riddled with ambiguous and indeter-
minate phrases and terms inconsistent with the rule of law,131 Madison 
reminded readers that language is inherently imprecise and imper-
fect—so much so, in fact, that “the Almighty himself” would find it 
difficult to express his “luminous” ideas in a clear and precise fash-
ion.132  It is for this reason “that no skill in the science of government 
has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, 
its three great provinces—the legislative, executive, and judiciary.”133  
Included in this generalization was the concept of energy.  Although 
Madison never attempted to define energy, he did state with certainty 
that it is essential to those things that “enter into the very definition of 
good government.”134  The upshot of Madison’s discussion was that 
some degree of indeterminacy affords government with the flexibility 
required to act with sufficient energy. 
Even though no one provided a definition of energy, everyone 
understood what it signified.  It connoted vigorous, decisive, flexible, 
and strong government—or, in Jefferson’s words, “high-toned” gov-
ernment.  When the Constitution was unveiled to the public in Sep-
tember 1787, one of the most common complaints advanced by critics 
was that the proposed government would give the President too much 
energy.  Instead of denying the accusation that the Constitution cre-
ated an energetic President, Federalists like Hamilton went on the of-
fensive and vigorously promoted the need for greater energy in gov-
ernment.  In the Federalist No. 70, which defended the “unity” of the 
President against alternatives such as an executive council, Hamilton 
explained: 
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the defini-
tion of good government.  It is essential to the protection of 
the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential 
to the steady administration of laws; to the protection of 
property against those irregular and high-handed combina-
tions which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of jus-
tice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and as-
saults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.135   
                                                        
 131.  For a survey of these criticisms and Federalist responses to them, see FATOVIC, su-
pra note 23, at 168–72. 
 132.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 245 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). 
 133.  Id. at 244. 
 134.  Id. at 243. 
 135.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 132, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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Hamilton was not alone in making the case for energy in the Ex-
ecutive.  Madison reinforced the link between energy and the presi-
dency he helped create when he wrote that “energy in government 
requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it 
by a single hand.”136  Future Supreme Court Justice James Iredell not-
ed at the North Carolina ratifying convention that “[o]ne of the great 
advantages attending a single Executive power is, the degree of secre-
cy and dispatch with which, on critical occasions, such a power can 
act.”137  Without actually using the term prerogative, which would have 
alarmed Americans already suspicious of executive power, those who 
invoked the idea of energy nevertheless called prerogative to mind in 
emphasizing the need for flexibility and discretion associated with the 
concept of energy. 
Once the executive branch was established, experience only con-
firmed what many had suspected: executive power would entail far 
more day-to-day discretion than the idea of the rule of law would 
seem to allow.  As Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton summed up 
the extent to which executive power—including that portion exer-
cised by subordinates of the President—entailed activities that could 
never be specified in advance, as the rule of law requires: 
 [T]here is and necessarily must be a great number of un-
defined particulars incident to the general duty of every of-
ficer, for the requiring of which no special warrant is to be 
found in any law. . . .  
 . . . .  
 . . . [T]here is no law providing for a thousandth part of 
the duties which each [executive] officer performs in the 
great political machine & which unless performed would ar-
rest its motion.138   
As discussed below, the Treasury Secretary found it necessary “to act 
according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescrip-
tion of the Law” in situations that fell far short of those life-
threatening emergencies that Locke had used to justify prerogative. 
                                                        
 136.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, supra note 132, at 244 (James Madison). 
 137.  James Iredell, Marcus III, in 16 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 323 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1986). 
 138.  Letter from Alexander Hamilton to William Heth (June 23[–24], 1791), in 8 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 499, 499–500 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1979). 
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IV.  DEBATES OVER THE MEANING OF EXECUTIVE POWER IN THE EARLY 
CONGRESSES 
The ratification of the Constitution resulted in the establishment 
of a single executive but failed to settle the meaning of executive 
power.  In fact, the creation of the presidency created new opportuni-
ties to contest the meaning of executive power.  To be sure, much of 
the debate that took place during the first few Congresses did focus 
on the proper interpretation of various clauses scattered throughout 
the text of the Constitution, but a significant amount of the debate 
revolved around the more fundamental question: What does execu-
tive power mean? 
The first major debate over the meaning of executive power con-
cerned the proper location of the removal power.139  Or, to put it 
more accurately, the debate over the proper location of the removal 
power raised a question about whether it was an executive power at 
all.  The dispute arose because Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution 
stipulated that the President would “have Power, by and with the Ad-
vice and Consent of the Senate” to appoint certain “inferior offic-
ers,”140 but the Constitution did not specify any means for removing 
officers except by the cumbersome process of impeachment.141  Mem-
bers of Congress generally agreed that the power to remove officers 
short of impeachment existed somewhere in the government, but 
they could not agree whether this power rested with the President 
alone, the Senate alone, or with the President and the Senate working 
in conjunction. 
Though much of the debate hinged on the meaning and impli-
cations of the language and structure of the Constitution, it some-
times turned to more theoretical considerations of the meaning of 
executive power.  Supporters of an exclusive presidential removal 
power often moved beyond the explicit text of the Constitution to 
make the case that a presidential power to remove inferior officers 
was an implied constitutional power and perhaps even an inherent 
executive power.  In general, they argued that because removal is an 
executive power, it belongs to the President, who, by virtue of Article 
II, Section 1, is vested with the executive power of the United States.142  
                                                        
 139.  For a summary of the major constitutional arguments advanced during the debate 
over the removal power, see DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 37–41 (1997). 
 140.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 141.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 142.  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
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The arch-Federalist Fisher Ames made the most forceful case for an 
exclusive presidential power: 
 The constitution places all executive power in the hands of 
the President, and could he personally execute all the laws, 
there would be no occasion for establishing auxiliaries. . . .  
But in order that he may be responsible to his country, he 
must have a choice in selecting his assistants, a control over 
them, with power to remove them when he finds the qualifi-
cations which induced their appointment cease to exist.143 
Critics, like James Jackson of Georgia, countered that executive 
power is not vested exclusively in the President.144  Instead, they ar-
gued, certain powers are divided between the branches in order to 
prevent tyranny.  In response to those who suggested that locating the 
removal power in the President would promote “energy,” John Page 
of Virginia declared, “The doctrine of energy in Government, as I said 
before, is the true doctrine of tyrants.”145 
Some of these disputes can be explained by differences in ideol-
ogy or by honest disagreements over the best way to interpret the 
Constitution.  But genuine confusion also helps account for the range 
and intensity of opinions expressed in this debate.  Participants in the 
debate used the term “executive power” without a common under-
standing of its meaning.  At one point, Michael Jenifer Stone asserted 
that these constant references to executive power did absolutely noth-
ing to clarify matters: “[T]elling me that this is an executive power [] 
raises no complete idea in my mind.”146  William L. Smith of South 
Carolina put his finger on one of the main sources of confusion: 
“What powers are executive, or incidental to the executive depart-
ment, will depend upon the nature of the Government; because some 
powers are vested in the Executive of a monarchy that are not in an 
aristocracy.”147  In other words, executive power had no unvarying 
meaning or essence, but instead changed from one context to anoth-
er. 
Uncertainty about the meaning of executive power—coupled 
with intense disagreements over the proper division of power in the 
national government—continued to shape a variety of debates that 
developed in the coming months and years.  Virtually every matter 
                                                        
 143.  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 492 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
 144.  Id. at 506. 
 145.  Id. at 572. 
 146.  Id. at 589. 
 147.  Id. at 566. 
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that involved the executive branch in one way or another touched off 
a debate over the proper divisions between executive and legislative 
power.  More often than not, the blurriness of these lines and the 
protean qualities of executive power made it easy for members of the 
first few Congresses to support expansions in the powers and respon-
sibilities of the executive branch, even when that would entail consid-
erable discretion.  Critics of the Constitution had worried that the in-
determinate nature of executive power would make it easy for the 
President to exercise powers and responsibilities that had not been 
authorized by the law.  What many of them did not realize was that 
this same indeterminacy would make it easy for Congress to delegate 
by law additional powers and responsibilities to this amorphous office. 
Not all of the debates that took place over the meaning of execu-
tive power were triggered by discussions about the powers and re-
sponsibilities of the President.  In the debate over establishment of 
the Treasury Department during the First Congress, some representa-
tives wondered whether the Secretary’s duty “‘to prepare and report 
estimates of the public revenue and public expenditures’” would be 
an unconstitutional abridgement of the prerogatives of the House.148  
John Page spoke for many when he argued that the Secretary’s report-
ing duty would interfere “in business of legislation.”149  Page reiterated 
his objections to allowing the Secretary of the Treasury even to rec-
ommend possible sources of revenue during the Second Congress 
when he stated that Anti-Federalist warnings about the inevitable 
growth of undefined executive power were already coming to pass.150  
Representative William Findley, from the backcountry of Pennsylva-
nia, echoed Page’s assertion that congressional reliance on the execu-
tive branch for information constituted “a transfer of Legislative au-
thority.”151 
In the following years, members of Congress debated the consti-
tutionality and the wisdom of delegating power to the President to es-
tablish post roads.  Opponents argued that giving the President this 
power would amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative 
authority to the executive branch.  Supporters of the post office bill 
argued that it was constitutional because all it did was give the Execu-
tive discretion within limits set by Congress.152  Perhaps the most vocal 
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proponent of the bill was the Massachusetts Federalist Theodore 
Sedgwick, who said he favored delegating this power to the President 
because members of Congress would be apt to favor their own con-
stituents rather than locate post roads in areas that served the best in-
terest of the country as a whole.153  Although Sedgwick also advanced 
the constitutional claim that there was nothing wrong with Congress 
delegating execution of the principles and goals that they set to an-
other branch, there was an even more basic reason why the Executive 
would continue to gain power: It was simply “impossible precisely to 
define a boundary line between the business of Legislative and Execu-
tive.”154  In the end, Congress declined to delegate this power to the 
President.  Instead, it delegated this and many other powers to the 
Postmaster General.  Indeed, the final bill gave the Postmaster Gen-
eral enormous discretion to establish post offices, determine the 
manner in which the mail would be delivered, and prescribe regula-
tions to subordinates, among other things.155 
One of the most blatantly partisan episodes from the Second 
Congress illustrates just how much discretion of the sort associated 
with prerogative figures into the exercise of what is supposed to be 
routine executive power.  Toward the very end of the Second Con-
gress, William Branch Giles, who quickly earned a reputation as one 
of the Washington Administration’s fiercest critics, introduced a set of 
resolutions in the House of Representatives accusing Alexander Ham-
ilton of misusing funds.  Giles and his allies alleged that the Treasury 
Secretary violated the law when he used monies in a way that had not 
been specifically authorized by Congress, when he borrowed more 
money from Holland than he was authorized, and when he failed to 
provide Congress adequate information in his report on these activi-
ties.  The most serious charge, and the one that most directly raised a 
constitutional question, was the allegation that Hamilton had used 
funds appropriated to pay off one debt with funds that had been ap-
propriated to pay another debt.  Hamilton defended these actions by 
pointing out that he had simply refinanced a loan of the United 
States at a lower interest rate by shifting around some funds.  Alt-
hough Hamilton had saved the government a substantial amount of 
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money, his critics argued that he should be removed from office be-
cause he had acted without the prescription of the law.156 
The debate that ensued revealed that critics and defenders of 
Hamilton alike believed that an element of prerogative is always in-
volved in any exercise of executive power, even when there is no life-
threatening emergency.  Hamilton’s supporters in the House pointed 
out that necessity (or in this case, a really good opportunity to save 
money) justifies departures from the strict letter of law.  William 
Smith argued that Hamilton’s actions should not be judged by how 
closely he hewed to the law, but by how well he served the public in-
terest—even if that involved a direct violation of the law, stating: 
 [I]t must be admitted, that there may be cases of a suffi-
cient urgency to justify a departure from it, and to make it 
the duty of the Legislature to indemnify an officer; as if an 
adherence would in particular cases, and under particular 
circumstances, prove ruinous to the public credit, or prevent 
the taking measures essential to the public safety, against in-
vasion or insurrection.  In cases of that nature, and which 
cannot be foreseen by the Legislature nor guarded against, a 
discretionary authority must be deemed to reside in the 
P[resident], or some other Executive officer, to be exercised 
for the public good; such exercise instead of being con-
strued into a crime, would always meet the approbation of 
the National Legislature.  If there be any weight in these re-
marks, it does not then follow as a general rule, that it is es-
sential to the due administration of the Government, that 
laws making specific appropriations should in all cases what-
soever, and under every public circumstance, be strictly ob-
served.157 
A few days later Smith elaborated on his conception of executive 
power, saying that “in all Governments a discretionary latitude was 
implied in Executive officers, where that discretion resulted from the 
nature of the office, or was in pursuance of general authority delegat-
ed by law.”158 
For critics of Hamilton, the fact that he violated the law was the 
decisive point, regardless of any good that came from it.  However, 
even many of his opponents accepted William Smith’s contention that 
it is sometimes permissible for an executive officer to step outside the 
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law in the performance of his responsibilities.  Madison, who had 
urged his fellow Framers to define executive power, now acknowl-
edged that prerogative is an unavoidable feature of executive power, 
stating: 
Much has been said on the necessity of sometimes departing 
from the strictness of legal appropriations, as a plea for any 
freedoms that may have been taken with them by the Secre-
tary.  He would not deny that there might be emergencies, 
in the course of human affairs, of so extraordinary and 
pressing a nature, as to absolve the Executive from an inflex-
ible conformity to the injunctions of the law.  It was, never-
theless, as essential to remember, as it was obvious to re-
mark, that in all such cases, the necessity should be palpable; 
that the Executive sanction should flow from the supreme 
source; and that the first opportunity should be seized for 
communicating to the Legislature the measures pursued, 
with the reasons explaining the necessity of them.  This early 
communication was equally enforced by prudence and by 
duty.  It was the best evidence of the motives for assuming 
the extraordinary power; it was a respect manifestly due to 
the Legislative authority; and it was more particularly indis-
pensable, as that alone would enable the Legislature, by a 
provident amendment of the law, to accommodate it to like 
emergencies in the future.159 
Madison denied that this situation presented a case of necessity, but 
he had conceded the basic point that supporters of a strong and en-
ergetic executive had been making: Legal rules cannot account for all 
that passes under the label of executive power.  In the end, Hamilton 
was exonerated of any wrongdoing with only four members voting in 
support of Giles’s resolutions.160 
Proponents of a strong executive would take advantage of the 
apparent elasticity of executive power to argue for expansions in the 
powers of the President during many important controversies that 
arose during the first years under the Constitution.  In his pseudony-
mous debate with James Madison over President Washington’s au-
thority to issue a Proclamation of Neutrality in the conflict between 
France and England, Hamilton exploited the undefined nature of ex-
ecutive power to argue that the vesting clause of Article II gives the 
President broad powers to conduct the foreign affairs of the United 
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States. Hamilton argued that the President’s power to interpret the 
law—including treaties—included the power to “first judge for him-
self their meaning.”161  Based on this power to interpret and enforce 
treaties, Hamilton maintained, Washington could effectively annul 
the part of America’s Treaty of Alliance with France that would have 
drawn the country into a war against England. 
Of course, Madison, Jefferson, and others would vigorously con-
test these and other attempts to expand the powers of the President.  
Such expansive interpretations of executive power were never univer-
sally accepted.  In fact, they would continue to generate some of the 
most heated controversies in the history of the early republic.  How-
ever, even those who were most insistent about the importance of fol-
lowing the strict letter of the law in a republican form of government 
conceded that the Executive possesses great latitude in interpreting 
and applying the law.  Jefferson drew a sharp contrast between the 
way that judges and executives ought to approach the law.  Although 
the judge is required to take “the intention of the lawgiver as his true 
guide” and give “effect” to all parts of the law,  
in laws merely executive, where no private right stands in the 
way, and the public object is the interest of all, a much freer 
scope of construction, in favor of the intention of the law, 
ought to be taken, and ingenuity ever should be exercised in 
devising constructions, which may save to the public the 
benefit of the law.162   
But even more remarkable than these statements is that Jefferson, 
that outspoken critic of “high-toned” government, would become 
perhaps the most articulate defender of Lockean prerogative in the 
nation’s history.  In his famous letter to John B. Colvin, Jefferson con-
firmed that there are circumstances “which make it a duty in officers 
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of high trust, to assume authorities beyond the law.”163  It was “embar-
rassing” to admit this, but “[a] strict observance of the written laws is 
doubtless one of the high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the high-
est.”164  There are extraordinary circumstances in which the Executive 
must act outside the law because strict adherence to the law would 
lead to disaster.165  The fact that a thinker who was otherwise so ada-
mant about the importance of drawing clear lines around different 
powers found it so difficult to maintain the lines between executive 
power and prerogative may help explain why executive power has 
been so capacious. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
All three powers—legislative, judicial, and executive—have 
grown substantially since the Constitution was ratified. But it is argua-
ble that the growth of legislative and judicial power has always re-
volved around law.  Increasing areas of social and economic life have 
come under legislative jurisdiction, but Congress’s activities are still 
fundamentally tied to or grow out of lawmaking (even if some of 
those laws actually end up delegating lawmaking powers to others).  
The Judiciary inserts itself into more domains of life, as well; but its 
activities are still connected to the interpretation of law—even if the 
way it interprets the law is sometimes tendentious.  Most of the growth 
in executive power has also been the result of law that has been dele-
gated by Congress or interpreted to the President’s own advantage.  
However, some of the growth in executive power has been uncon-
nected to law in any direct way.  Presidents have taken extraordinary 
actions without express legal authorization since the Constitution was 
established.  Of course, as Jack Goldsmith has argued in much of his 
work, lawyers for presidential administrations will always insist that 
there is some law somewhere that somehow authorizes whatever ac-
tions the President thinks is necessary.  But the legal basis for the 
President’s ability to deploy forces abroad without congressional au-
thorization, eavesdrop on communications with individuals in other 
countries, use drones to assassinate suspected terrorists and their as-
sociates, and do a host of other things that have become shockingly 
routine since 9-11 is questionable at best. 
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We have to consider how much the growth of executive power in 
these and other areas owes to a tendency toward the extra-legal that 
we are often reluctant to acknowledge.  There may be few outright or 
acknowledged instances of prerogative today, but there may be an el-
ement of prerogative in all executive power.  The inability of early 
modern constitutional thinkers and their followers in the early repub-
lic to maintain a sharp distinction between supposedly routine and 
rule-bound exercises of executive power, on the one hand, and ex-
traordinary and extra-legal exercises of prerogative, on the other, 
suggests that these powers actually fall along a continuum.  If the de-
velopment of the presidency in the twentieth century, and especially 
since 9-11, has tended to blur the lines between executive power and 
prerogative, that may be because they were never distinct categories 
in the first place.  Recognizing just how easy it is to move along the 
continuum between actions prescribed by law and those without the 
prescription of the law does not require acceptance of any particular 
exercise of power.  But recognizing the potential for extra-legal action 
in all executive power may be required to keep it in check. 
